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RISK-NEUTRAL PRICING OF FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS IN
EMISSION MARKETS: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH
SAM HOWISON AND DANIEL SCHWARZ
Abstract. We present a novel approach to the pricing of financial instruments
in emission markets—for example, the European Union Emissions Trading
Scheme (EU ETS). The proposed structural model is positioned between ex-
isting complex full equilibrium models and pure reduced-form models. Using
an exogenously specified demand for a polluting good, it gives a causal ex-
planation for the accumulation of CO2 emissions and takes into account the
feedback effect from the cost of carbon to the rate at which the market emits
CO2. We derive a forward-backward stochastic differential equation for the
price process of the allowance certificate and solve the associated semilinear
partial differential equation numerically. We also show that derivatives written
on the allowance certificate satisfy a linear partial differential equation. The
model is extended to emission markets with multiple compliance periods, and
we analyze the impact different intertemporal connecting mechanisms, such as
borrowing, banking, and withdrawal, have on the allowance price.
1. Introduction
Global warming has been recognized by policy makers as a key 21st century
problem. The phenomenon is widely believed to be the result of a greenhouse effect
that is caused by increases in atmospheric gases such as carbon dioxide, methane,
ozone, and water vapor. Forced to address this issue, 37 countries ratified the Kyoto
Protocol on December 11, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. Under this agreement, binding
limits, expressed in assigned amount units (AAUs) and measured in tonnes of CO2
equivalent greenhouse gas (GHG),1 are imposed on the emissions of participating
countries. To meet their obligations, countries may draw upon—amongst other
mechanisms—any of the following three market-based mechanisms:
(1) The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), defined in article 12 of the
Kyoto Protocol, allows countries to implement emission-reduction projects
in developing countries. For this they receive certified emission reduction
(CER) credits, each worth one tonne of CO2 equivalent, which can be used
for meeting Kyoto targets.
(2) The Joint Implementation (JI) mechanism, defined in article 6 of the Kyoto
Protocol, allows countries to earn emission reduction units (ERUs), each
worth one tonne of CO2 equivalent, from establishing emission-reduction
projects in other Kyoto countries. Like CERs, these units can be used to
meet Kyoto targets.
The second named author acknowledges support from the Carnegie Mellon-Portugal Program,
grant UTA CMU/MAT/0006/2009 (FCT)..
1The CO2 equivalent of a given greenhouse gas denotes the amount of CO2 that has the same
global warming potential over a specified timescale.
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(3) Emissions Trading, as defined in article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol, allows
market participants that have AAUs, CERs, or ERUs to spare, to sell their
excess capacity to other participants. This creates the so-called carbon
market.
The Kyoto Protocol merely constitutes a global framework that encourages par-
ticipating countries to put in place platforms on which CERs, ERUs, and AAUs
can be traded. Subject to broad provisions, the market design of any local imple-
mentation of an emissions trading system is left to the hosting countries.
In this paper we present a simple model for emissions trading. Our model incor-
porates market design features which are commonly found in successful implemen-
tations of such trading schemes—for example, the SO2 and NOx trading programs
in the US or the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). Because of
its pioneering role, we choose the latter example to illustrate the working principle
of emissions trading.
1.1. Emissions trading in the EU ETS. The limit on emissions during one
compliance period, also referred to as the cap on emissions, is realized through
an initial allocation of allowance certificates—each worth one EU allowance unit
(EUA) and permitting its holder to emit one tonne of CO2 equivalent
2 GHGs—by
the government to firms in the market. At the end of each compliance period,
firms must offset their accumulated emissions by submitting an adequate number
of certificates. If they fail to do so (the event of noncompliance), they must pay
a monetary penalty for each unit of excess emissions. Throughout a compliance
period allowances are traded actively, and this leads to the formation of a price,
which represents the cost of carbon. Firms can then buy allowances to avoid the
penalty, or exploit their own pollution-light production by selling them.
In practice, an emissions trading scheme consists of multiple compliance periods,
each with its own distinct cap and penalty. Subsequent periods are joined by
connecting mechanisms, which regulate the transition from one compliance period
to the next. The key mechanisms go by the names of banking, borrowing, and
withdrawal. The banking mechanism allows market participants to carry allowance
certificates, allocated for compliance at the end of the current period, forward to the
next compliance period. Similarly, borrowing enables firms to use the next period’s
certificates for compliance at the end of the current trading period. The withdrawal
mechanism constitutes additional punishment for noncompliance: it prescribes that,
in addition to the monetary penalty payment, one allowance certificate from the
next period’s allocation is withdrawn for each unit of excess emissions at the end
of the current period.
Since the Linking Directive came into force, the EU has been accepting credits
from the CDM and the JI mechanism for compliance in its trading scheme. Be-
cause one EUA is equivalent to an AAU, the base unit of the Kyoto Protocol, CERs,
ERUs, and EUAs can all be traded within the same system straightforwardly. In
practice, this takes place mostly on platforms such as the European Energy Ex-
change (EEX), where EUA and CER spot and future contracts are traded actively.
Emission reduction as part of a trading scheme occurs in two ways. The im-
mediate consequence is to shift production within the existing fleet of resources to
pollution friendlier ones—an effect we refer to as load shifting. The cost of carbon
2For simplicity we write CO2 from now on whenever we mean CO2 equivalent GHGs.
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also makes it attractive for firms to invest in long-term abatement measures if the
cost of reducing their emissions by one unit lies below the value of an allowance
certificate. Even if a firm has sufficient allowances to cover its emissions, it should
make use of all available emission-reduction measures whose marginal abatement
cost (MAC) lies below the value of the allowance certificate. It can then sell spare
certificates to companies whose MAC is above the market price of allowances and
make a profit. For this reason it has been argued that cap-and-trade schemes pro-
vide emission reduction at the lowest cost to society. However, there is also evidence
which suggests that the implied cost of carbon to make long-term investment in
renewables such as solar cells worthwhile is $196 per tonne of CO2; this is far above
current allowance prices (cf. [1]).
1.2. Electricity generation: A pollution-intensive process. The primary
process that releases CO2 emissions is the burning of fossil fuels. Since this is
heavily used for the generation of electric power, electricity offers itself as an ex-
emplary good for the academic study of emission markets. A wide spectrum of
technologies, including nuclear fission, wind turbines, hydropower, and the burning
of fossil fuels, are used for the generation of electricity. Because these technologies
differ substantially in their emission rates it is important to identify which genera-
tors are used in the market at any point in time. In principle, this can be deduced
from the electricity bid stack.
The bid stack, introduced in [3, 22, 2, 13], aggregates the bidding behavior of firms
that supply electricity. A bid is the amount of electricity a single generator is willing
to supply at a specific price. Firms submit their Pareto-optimal bids for each hour
of the next trading day to a central market administrator. An example would be
a generator submitting bids (600MW,100e), (200MW,120e), and (200MW,200e).
This generator offers to sell its first 600MW for the specified hour at a price of
100e, the next 200MW at a price of 120e, and a further 200MW at a price of
200e. Consequently, each firm submits an increasing simple (step) function that
maps electricity supply to its marginal price. The market administrator aggregates
the bids for each price level and arranges them in increasing order of price. Using
the cheapest bids first, electricity is supplied at the marginal price of the last unit
of electricity that is needed in order to satisfy demand.
The bids of generators reflect their production costs (cf. [13]). In particular,
firms consider fixed and variable costs when deciding upon their bid levels. In the
absence of emissions trading—a scenario called business-as-usual—the latter costs
consist predominantly of the price to be paid by a particular plant for the amount
of fuel necessary to generate each unit of electricity (the plant’s heat rate multiplied
by the price of the utilized fuel). The introduction of a cap-and-trade system levies
a cost on emissions. In principle, firms may remain idle and sell unused certificates
to the market. Therefore, if they choose to produce and to utilize their certificates
for compliance purposes, this forgone profit constitutes an opportunity cost, which
leads to an increase in variable costs. As a consequence bids increase by an amount
equal to the marginal emissions rate of the plant (measured in tonnes of CO2 per
MWh) multiplied by the allowance price.
Although not a requirement for the model that we propose, in the absence of
emissions trading, pollution-intensive fuels have historically gathered on the left
end of the bid stack because they are cheaper to use, whereas environmentally
friendlier technologies tend to be more expensive and are concentrated further to
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the right.3 The rationale behind cap-and-trade is that for sufficiently high carbon
costs, pollution-intensive technologies become more expensive than environmentally
friendlier ones. The market administrator rearranges bids to preserve the increasing
order, and as a result environmentally friendly technologies are now called upon
before pollution intensive ones, leading to cleaner production of electricity.
Example 1. Consider a simple market with one coal generator and one gas genera-
tor, who bid at only one price level. We illustrate the influence of emissions trading
on the bid stack in Figure 1. Initially the cost of carbon is low, and bids from coal
generators are cheaper than those from gas generators. Accordingly, coal bids come
first in the bid stack, and the marginal emissions corresponding to bids further to
the left in the stack are relatively higher than those corresponding to bids on the
right. As emissions become more costly the bid levels from coal and gas generators
increase, with coal bids doing so more than gas bids. This results in the market
administrator rearranging the bid stack and placing gas first. The result of the
higher allowance price is lower emissions, as intended.
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Figure 1. A schematic of the rearrangement of the bid and the
emissions stacks as the cost of carbon increases.
The price setting mechanism described above applies directly to day-ahead spot
prices set by uniform auctions, as is the case at most exchanges today. For example,
the power spot price for Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and France is determined
by such auctions organized by the EEX. Although, since the onset of electricity
market deregulation in 1998, the auction-based trading volume at the EEX has
increased substantially over the last few years—from 49 TWh in 2003 to 279 TWh
in 2010 (cf. [16])—a large share of electricity in Europe is still traded over-the-
counter or on a forward basis. However, we believe that in a competitive market
with rational agents the day-ahead auction price also serves as the key reference
point for real-time and over-the-counter prices (cf. [31]).
3An exception to this rule of thumb constitutes must-run bids, which are always placed on the
left end of the bid stack and may, for example, contain bids from nuclear generators that do not
emit.
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1.3. Literature review. The first academic treatment of emission markets can
be traced back to [15, 30]. Early models of allowance trading in discrete and in
continuous time were proposed in [14, 27, 29, 33, 34, 36]. More recently, emission
markets have been treated from two different angles. On the one hand are full
equilibrium models that derive the price processes of allowances and goods (the
production of which causes pollution) from the preferences of individual firms and
additional sources of uncertainty. These have proved insightful but rather cumber-
some in their complexity (cf. [10, 11]). On the other hand are approaches, which
rely on the concept of absence of arbitrage (i.e. ruling out the possibility of making
a profit starting from nothing) to specify the allowance price evolution directly as
the expectation of the discounted future cash flows under a probability structure
which, in the mathematical finance literature, is called risk-neutral (cf. [20]); then
the parameters in the model are calibrated to market data. In these models, the
event of noncompliance is described exogenously, and no causal explanation is given
for the accumulation of emissions in the economy. Within this class of models one
can distinguish between models that ignore the feedback from the allowance price
to the rate at which firms emit (cf. [12]) and those that take this feedback effect
into account through an exogenously specified abatement function (cf. [4, 8, 23]).
1.4. The current paper. In this paper we propose a structural model which
draws upon elements of the equilibrium approach but still retains the simplicity
of the risk-neutral approach. We take as a starting point an exogenously specified
stochastic process representing demand for electricity,4 and we regard allowances as
derivatives (that is, contingent claims: securities whose value at a specified future
date is determined by the state of the world at that time, but whose value now is to
be found) on demand and cumulative emissions. The demand process is translated
into an emissions process via the bid stack, which allows us to deduce which gener-
ators are active at any point in time. As noted above, the bid stack both influences
and is influenced by the allowance price. This leads naturally to a formulation of
the allowance price as the backward part of a forward-backward stochastic differ-
ential equation (FBSDE). To solve the problem numerically, we derive a semilinear
partial differential equation (PDE) for the allowance price as a function of demand
and cumulative emissions, and we give a formal asymptotic description of the so-
lution behavior near the end of a compliance period, highlighting the way in which
the nonlinearity in the governing PDE — which is a consequence of the feedback
from allowance prices to the behavior of energy producers — leads to a nonzero
probability that the total cumulative emissions hit the cap exactly (cf. [8, 7]). In a
sense, the market functions so as to produce the maximum emissions possible with-
out incurring the penalty and this is an important practical consequence of our
analysis. We extend our model to emission markets with multiple compliance peri-
ods and analyze the impact different intertemporal connecting mechanisms such as
borrowing, banking, and withdrawal have on the allowance price. The last section
is devoted to the pricing of European derivatives written on the allowance certifi-
cate. Throughout the analysis we focus on the trading of AAUs only. The joining
4Although we have formulated the problem in terms of electricity generation (which is, indeed,
responsible for a large proportion of the emissions covered by the Kyoto Protocol), we may at
least conceptually extend our model to all emissions covered by Kyoto if we view the formation of
the equilibrium price for energy as equivalent to the action of the market regulator’s arrangement
of the bid stack in increasing price order.
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of multiple markets using CERs and ERUs in the present setting is left to future
research and is addressed from a different point of view in, for example, [9].
2. From electricity markets to carbon emissions
In this section we develop our approach to modeling the interaction between
electricity and emission markets. We introduce the random factors and the key pa-
rameters that are later shown to drive the price formation of allowance certificates.
An important part is played by the merit order—the rule by which available re-
sources with the lowest marginal costs of production are called upon first to supply
electricity. We introduce the electricity bid stack, which is modeled as a continuous
map from the supply of electricity to its marginal price, and analogously define
the emissions stack as a continuous map to the marginal emissions caused by the
production of the last unit. Using an equilibrium assumption, we relate supply
to demand; we show how this allows us to deduce which technologies are used to
meet demand at any point in time and the total market emissions rate this pro-
duction schedule implies. Finally, we illustrate the impact the introduction of a
cost of carbon has on the bid and emissions stacks. In the context of an emissions
trading scheme the merit order assumption very naturally leads to load shifting,
the reallocation of energy production from emission-intensive to pollution friendly
resources.
2.1. Market set-up. We consider a finite time interval [0, T ], which initially cor-
responds to one compliance period; later we will consider multiperiod markets.
We denote by (Ω,F , (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P) a filtered probability space satisfying all the
usual assumptions, where (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is generated by a standard Brownian motion
(Wt)t∈[0,T ], the only source of randomness in the market. In order to simplify the
notation we omit the subscript that restricts a stochastic process to the time in-
terval [0, T ] from now on. We deviate from this habit only in section 3.2, where
it becomes important as part of a multiperiod setting, and in section 4, where we
discuss the pricing of derivatives.
Agents in our market demand a good, the production of which causes emissions;
as discussed above, we take this good to be electricity. Firms can produce electricity
using different technologies that vary in their costs of production and their emissions
intensity. The market is subject to an emissions trading scheme, as follows. Each
registered firm receives an initial allocation of allowances, which can be used to offset
its cumulative emissions at the end of the compliance period. If a firm is unable
to submit a sufficient number of certificates, its excess emissions are subject to the
payment of a monetary penalty. Allowances are represented by printed certificates.
Because their cost of carry is negligible, we consider them to be liquidly traded
financial products in which long and short positions can be taken. Consequently,
if a firm believes its initial allocation to be incorrect, it can buy or sell allowances
as needed. This leads to a liquid market and the formation of a price at which
allowances are traded.
Analogous to the idea of a representative agent, we ignore the aggregation prob-
lem and instead take the point of view of the whole market. Our goal then becomes
to determine the arbitrage-free price of emission permits as a function of the aggre-
gate forces that act in the market. As will be shown in section 3, this price directly
and crucially depends on the accumulated emissions during the compliance period
and on the aggregate demand for electricity.
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The actions of consumers in the market result in an exogenously given Ft-
adapted demand process (Dt). Firms respond to this demand by generating elec-
tricity. In particular, at any time 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the aggregate of all firms supplies an
amount (ξt) of electricity. We assume that the market uses only currently available
information to decide on its production level and that this level is always nonneg-
ative and below a constant maximum production capacity ξmax ≥ 0. Therefore, ξt
is Ft-adapted, and
0 ≤ ξt ≤ ξmax for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Moreover, we assume that there are always sufficient resources in the market to
meet demand so that
0 ≤ Dt ≤ ξmax for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The demand process is assumed to be perfectly inelastic, as is frequently justifi-
able in electricity markets (cf. [10, 13]), and demand and supply are related by a
Walrasian equilibrium assumption (cf. [37]). This concept is realized by the mar-
ket administrator, who ensures that aggregate demand for and aggregate supply of
energy are matched on a daily basis, namely, that
(1) Dt = ξt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
Typically, spot data for demand and supply is quoted in megawatts. For example,
a demand of 60MW for one hour is equivalent to 60MWh.
The production of electricity causes CO2 emissions in a way that we describe
more precisely in sections 2.2 and 2.3. The total (cumulative) emissions during the
time interval [0, t] are described by the process (Et), which is measured in tonnes
of CO2. Moreover, since emission intensive production resources are finite and
demand is bounded, (Et) is also bounded; i.e.,
0 ≤ Et ≤ Emax for 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
The regulator decides on an acceptable maximum level of cumulative emissions
during the compliance period (the cap) and issues a corresponding number of al-
lowance certificates, 0 ≤ Ecap ≤ Emax, measured in tonnes of CO2. At the end
of the compliance period, cumulative emissions in the market are offset against
the initial allocation of allowances. Certificates that are not used for this purpose
expire worthless in the case of the single-period setup, whereas unaccounted emis-
sions are subject to a monetary penalty payment at a rate Π ≥ 0. Thus, an amount
(ET − Ecap)+ of emissions is penalized.
The allowance certificates constitute traded assets in the market. Their value is
represented by the process (At). We shall also consider options written on the cer-
tificate and assume the existence of a riskless money market account with constant
risk-free rate r ≥ 0.
2.2. The bid and emissions stacks. We turn to the modeling of the cumulative
emissions. We begin with the business-as-usual market and analyze the impact of
an emissions trading scheme in the next subsection.
Key to our analysis is the following assumption, which summarizes the actions
of the central market administrator as introduced above.
Assumption 1. The market administrator ensures that resources are used according
to the merit order. This means that the cheapest production technologies are called
upon first to satisfy a given demand, and hence electricity is supplied at the lowest
possible price.
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As explained in section 1.2, bid levels are mostly determined by variable costs.
Therefore, these costs play an integral part in determining the merit order ar-
rangement in Assumption 1. The resulting increasing map from market supply of
electricity to marginal price forms the bid stack. As explained in the introduction,
the bid stack is, strictly speaking, an increasing simple function. In practice, how-
ever, it consists of sufficiently many steps to be approximated by a smooth function.
This leads us to the following definition.
Definition 1. The business-as-usual bid stack is given by the continuous function
bBAU(ξ) : [0, ξmax] 7→ [0,∞),
where bBAU(·) ∈ C1(0, ξmax) and dbBAU/dξ > 0.
Here and throughout the rest of the paper, the variable ξ represents the supply
of electricity (measured in MW). Correspondingly, bBAU(ξ) denotes the bid level of
the marginal production unit (measured in e per MWh).
We note immediately that in reality business-as-usual bid levels are stochastic.
Most importantly, fuel prices, which are key drivers of variable costs, fluctuate
continuously. In principle the model that we propose can be extended to include
stochastic fuel prices as part of the variable costs that determine firms’ bids. The
business-as-usual bid stack bBAU would then become a function of additional in-
dependent variables (the prices of the fuels used in the production process), and
the dimensionality of the allowance pricing problem (9) would increase. Such an
extension should be considered when one is interested in pricing contracts such as,
for example, clean spread options, which explicitly feature the prices of electricity,
fuels, and emissions in their payoff. In this case the subtle dependence of electricity
spot prices on fuel prices becomes important. Since we are predominantly interested
in the price formation of allowance certificates, we only mention the possibility of
this extension and leave its investigation to future research.5
In the current paper we are interested only in the relative position of the different
technologies in the bid stack. Fluctuations in fuel prices become important only if
they induce merit order changes. From historic data observations this is relevant
only in the long run, and we prefer not to consider it for now. Hence we model the
business-as-usual bid stack as a deterministic function (cf. [3]), allowing us to focus
exclusively on the impact of emissions trading on variable costs and the merit order
in section 2.3.
Remark 1. As pointed out in the introduction, emission-intensive technologies tend
to be cheaper than environmentally friendly ones as a means to produce electricity.
Therefore, we find that bids associated with a small level of electricity supply stem
mostly from emission-intensive generators, while bids at the right end of the inter-
val [0, ξmax] stem mostly from environmentally friendly ones (as remarked earlier,
exceptions to this rule are nuclear plants, which do not cause any CO2 emissions
and are generally placed at the very left end in the bid stack). In between exists a
spectrum in which a mixture of technologies contributes to bids. This assumption
has been confirmed (cf. [13]) by analyzing the correlation between production costs
and bid levels.
5Since the original publication of this article in [25] research in this direction has been under-
taken (cf. [6]).
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Analogous to the bid stack, we construct an emissions stack by creating a map
from the supply of electricity to the marginal emissions associated with the supply
of the last unit.
Definition 2. The marginal emissions stack is given by the continuous function
e(ξ) : [0, ξmax] 7→ (0,∞),
where e(·) ∈ C1(0, ξmax).
With the above definition, e(ξ) associates with a specific supply of electricity ξ
the emissions rate of the marginal unit (measured in tonnes of CO2 per MWh).
Proposition 1. The business-as-usual market emissions rate µBAUE is given by
µBAUE (D) := κ
∫ D
0
e(ξ) dξ for 0 ≤ D ≤ ξmax,
where the scaling constant κ is the ratio of the emissions period T to that of the
time unit associated with the marginal emissions stack e (typically, T is measured
in years and κ is the number of hours per year).
Proof. The Walrasian equilibrium assumption (1) for our inelastic model implies
that the market produces the exact amount of electricity consumers demand and
that—under business-as-usual—the generation capacity associated with the interval
[0, D] is used for this purpose. The market emissions rate per hour is then obtained
at any time by integrating over the marginal emissions stack up to the current level
of demand. We rescale this rate with κ so that µBAUE is the market emissions rate
per unit of T . 
2.3. Load shifting: A short-term abatement measure. We now analyze the
effects of emissions trading on the business-as-usual economy introduced above. As
explained in the introduction, emissions trading puts a price on carbon and thereby
increases the production costs of firms. In particular, it makes it more expensive
for firms that rely on emission-intensive technologies to produce. For each unit of
CO2 that these firms emit in excess of their initial allocation, they must buy an
allowance contract in order to avoid penalization; the cost of carbon is a real cost.
Alternatively, if a firm owns more allowances than it requires, it can sell spare ones
in the market. In this case, the cost of carbon represents an opportunity cost.
We ignore the possibility that firms might invest in long-term abatement projects
and focus only on the direct impact on the bid stack. We assume that, in order to
maintain their profit margin, firms pass the emissions-related increase in production
costs on to consumers. Because the cost of carbon is represented by the price of an
allowance certificate, the business-as-usual bids of each firm increase by an amount
equal to the allowance price multiplied by the marginal emissions rate of that firm.
On an aggregate level this means that, for a given allowance price A the bid stack
now becomes the function g, where
(2) g(A, ξ) := bBAU(ξ) +Ae(ξ) for 0 ≤ A <∞, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξmax.
For A = 0, (2) is equivalent to the business-as-usual bid stack. For positive cer-
tificate prices emissions trading may cause the mapping ξ 7→ g(·, ξ) to lose its
monotonicity. In particular, we observe that bids associated with large marginal
emission rates become relatively more expensive, as the cost of carbon makes it
relatively more costly for firms relying on dirty fuels, such as coal, to produce.
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By the merit order assumption the market administrator calls upon generators
in increasing order of their bid levels. We define the set of active generation units
at a given allowance and electricity price P by
(3) S(A,P ) := {ξ ∈ [0, ξmax] : g(A, ξ) ≤ P} for 0 ≤ A <∞, 0 ≤ P <∞.
By the definition of a sublevel set, P 7→ λ(S(·, P )), where λ denotes the Lebesgue
measure, is strictly increasing; under the following assumption, it is also continuous
and therefore invertible.
Assumption 2.
λ
({
ξ ∈ (0, ξmax) : ∂b
BAU
∂ξ
(ξ) +A
∂e
∂ξ
(ξ) = 0
})
= 0 for 0 ≤ A <∞.
Using (3), for observed values of the allowance price, the market bid stack b is
now defined by
b(A, ξ) := λ(S(A, ·))−1(ξ) for 0 ≤ A <∞, 0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξmax.
This immediately yields the market price of electricity P , which is given by
P := b(A,D) for 0 ≤ A <∞, 0 ≤ D ≤ ξmax.
Whereas under business-as-usual demand D is met using the generation capacity
[0, D] (considered a subset of the domain of the emissions stack e), emissions trading
may shift this interval further to the right, or, depending on the shape of the
marginal emissions stack, split it up into multiple sets with combined Lebesgue
measure D—an effect we refer to as load shifting. We make the impact of load
shifting on the market emissions rate µE precise in the next proposition.
Proposition 2. In the presence of cap-and-trade and given an allowance price A
and demand level D, the market emissions rate µE is given by
(4) µE(A,D) = κ
∫
Sp(A,D)
e(ξ) dξ for 0 ≤ A <∞, 0 ≤ D ≤ ξmax,
where Sp(A,D) := S(A, b(A,D)).
Proof. The proof is immediate from the discussion above. 
We note that the business-as-usual market emissions rate is of course a special
case of (4), which is obtained by setting A = 0, in which case Sp(0, D) = [0, D].
Remark 2. As described earlier, in reality the bid and marginal emissions stack
are step functions, whose finitely many constant values correspond to firms’ bids
and their corresponding marginal emissions. To model the impact of a positive
allowance price on the bid stack in this case, one would add the cost of carbon
to bids as usual, and then the resulting step function is rearranged in increasing
order. Because of the discrete nature of the problem, the rearrangement induces a
permutation ν on the bids, which is then applied to the marginal emissions stack.
Instantaneous emissions are now obtained by integrating the rearranged emissions
stack over the closed interval [0, D]. We prefer to work with the continuous limit
of the bid and marginal emissions stack. In this case the permutation ν cannot be
defined explicitly, and we identify active firms with the set Sp.
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In the following lemma we prove some technical properties of µE , which show
that the model we propose for the market emissions rate makes intuitive sense and
leads to a suitably regular function.
Lemma 1. The market emissions rate µE satisfies the following.
(L.1) The map D 7→ µE(·, D) is
(i) strictly increasing and
(ii) Lipschitz continuous.
(L.2) The map A 7→ µE(A, ·) is
(i) nonincreasing and
(ii) Lipschitz continuous.
(L.3) µE is bounded.
(L.1) (i) By Assumption 2 and the definition of sublevel set, for 0 ≤ D1 <
D2 ≤ ξmax, Sp(·, D1) ⊂ Sp(·, D2). Since e(ξ) > 0 on [0, ξmax] the result
follows.
(ii) For 0 ≤ D1 < D2 ≤ ξmax and with the definition ∆DSp(D2, D1) :=
Sp(·, D2) \ Sp(·, D1),
µE(·, D2)− µE(·, D1) = κ
∫
∆DSp(D2,D1)
e(ξ) dξ
≤ λ (∆DSp(D2, D1))κmax
ξ
e(ξ)
= (D2 −D1)κmax
ξ
e(ξ).
The case D2 < D1 is treated similarly.
(L.2) (i) For 0 ≤ A1 < A2 < ∞ and with the definition ∆ASp(A1, A2) :=
Sp(A1, ·) \ Sp(A2, ·),
µE(A1, ·)− µE(A2, ·) = κ
∫
∆ASp(A1,A2)
e(ξ) dξ − κ
∫
∆ASp(A2,A1)
e(ξ) dξ.
Since λ(∆ASp(A1, A2)) = λ(∆
ASp(A2, A1)), the result follows from
the observation that, for a given 0 ≤ D ≤ ξmax, e(ξ) = (g(A2, ξ) −
g(A1, ξ))(A2−A1)−1 > (b(A2, D)−b(A1, D))(A2−A1)−1 on ∆ASp(A1, A2)
and that e(ξ) = (g(A2, ξ)−g(A1, ξ))(A2−A1)−1 ≤ (b(A2, D)−b(A1, D))(A2−
A1)
−1 on ∆ASp(A2, A1).
(ii) From above we know that
µE(A1, ·)− µE(A2, ·) ≤ C1λ(∆ASp(A1, A2))
for some constant C1 ≥ 0. It is also clear that ∆ASp(A1, A2) (and
similarly ∆ASp(A2, A1)) can be written as the union of a finite number
of intervals. As A1 increases to A2, there are three possibilities: (a)
existing intervals grow or shrink; (b) new intervals appear, or existing
ones disappear (by Assumption 2 this always happens at a point); and
(c) the intervals remain unchanged. Differentiating the level curves
g(A, ξ) = b(A,D) with respect to ξ, for a given level of demand, we find
that
dξ
dA
= −
(
∂g
∂A
− ∂b
∂A
)/
∂g
∂ξ
.
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By Assumption 2 the right-hand side is bounded by a constant,6 say,
C2 ≥ 0. Therefore, as A changes, in each case (a)–(c), the endpoints of
the intervals defining ∆ASp(A2, A1) do not move faster than C2(A2 −
A1). Therefore, also λ(∆
ASp(A1, A2)) ≤ C2(A2 − A1). The case A1 >
A2 is treated similarly, and the result follows.
(L.3) Boundedness of µE follows from the boundedness of e and the fact that
Sp(A,D) ⊆ [0, ξmax] for all A ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ D ≤ ξmax.
From the definition of instantaneous emissions we derive cumulative emissions
by integrating over (4), up to the current time t.
Figure 2 illustrates the effect of load shifting and the resulting reduction in the
market emissions rate under the assumption that under BAU dirtier production
technologies are placed further to the left in the bid stack than cleaner ones (see
Remark 1).
3. Risk-neutral pricing of allowance certificates
In this section we address the problem of determining the arbitrage-free price of
an allowance certificate given the current demand for electricity and the cumulative
emissions to date in the economy. (Recall that the notion of an arbitrage-free price
rules out the possibility of making a profit starting with no initial investment.)
We do this initially in the setting of an emissions market with one compliance
period; subsequently we generalize the model to deal with markets that consist of
multiple consecutive compliance periods and examine the impact that connecting
mechanisms, namely, banking, borrowing, and withdrawal, have on the certificate
price. One of the groundbreaking results in the field of mathematical finance was
the realization that the absence of arbitrage is in fact equivalent to the existence of
a very particular probability measure, say Q, on (Ω,F) (cf. [20, 21]). This measure
is equivalent to P, meaning that P(N) = 0 if and only if Q(N) = 0, and has the
property that the discounted prices of all tradable assets (the allowance certificates
in our case) are martingales under Q. This motivates our next assumption.
Assumption 3. There exists an equivalent martingale measure Q ∼ P, under which,
for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the discounted price of any tradable asset is a martingale. We refer
to Q as the risk-neutral measure.
We begin by making some additional assumptions about the demand and cumu-
lative emissions processes (Dt) and (Et). We assume that at time t = 0 demand
for electricity is known. Thereafter, it evolves according to an Itoˆ diffusion; i.e., for
0 ≤ t ≤ T , under the measure Q, demand for electricity is given by the stochastic
process
(5) dDt = µD(Dt)dt+ σD(Dt)dW˜t, D0 = d ∈ (0, ξmax),
where (W˜t) is Ft-adapted and a Q-Brownian motion (we postpone the discussion
of the relevance of the regularity of the coefficients to section 3.1). The assumption
that demand is perfectly inelastic is reflected in the fact that both coefficients
are functions of demand only. Note that if there were a feedback from price to
demand in the model then additional nonlinearities to those we see below would
arise. Note also that in practice demand for electricity exhibits seasonal periodicity,
6Throughout this proof we allow C2 to change from occurrence to occurrence.
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Figure 2. Under business-as-usual conditions, the bid stack bBAU
implies that resources associated with the interval [0, D] are used
to meet demand. Therefore, instantaneous emissions are obtained
by integrating over the emissions stack from 0 to D. Under the in-
fluence of a cap-and-trade scheme, the function b leads to resources
being shifted to the interval [ξ1, ξ2]. Instantaneous emissions are
now given by the (smaller) integral over the emissions stack from
ξ1 to ξ2.
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an attribute that would cause µD to depend on time explicitly. For simplicity we
choose to ignore this feature.
Cumulative emissions are measured from the beginning of the compliance period
when time t = 0 so that E0 = 0. Subsequently, they are determined by integrating
over the market emissions rate µE derived in Proposition 2. Consequently, the
cumulative emissions process is represented by an absolutely continuous process;
i.e., for 0 ≤ t ≤ T ,
(6) dEt = µE(At, Dt)dt, E0 = 0.
Note that with this definition the process (Et) is nondecreasing, which makes intu-
itive sense considering that it represents a cumulative quantity.
3.1. One compliance period. To formulate the pricing model, it remains to char-
acterize the allowance certificate price process (At). This is different from the spec-
ification of (Dt) and (Et), because its value at time t = 0 is unknown. An arbitrage
argument, however, allows us to determine its value at the end of the compliance
period. The event of noncompliance is {ET ≥ Ecap}; then the value of the allowance
certificate at time t = T is given by the terminal condition
(7) AT =
{
0 for 0 ≤ ET < Ecap,
Π for Ecap ≤ ET ≤ Emax.
From Assumption 3 we know that the discounted allowance price is a martingale
under the measure Q. Therefore, the allowance price is given as the discounted
conditional expectation of its terminal condition under this measure; i.e.,
(8) At = e
−r(T−t)ΠEQ
[
I[Ecap,∞)(ET )
∣∣Ft] for 0 ≤ t ≤ T,
which shows that the allowance price process (At) takes values in [0,Π] only.
Proposition 3. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , the price of an allowance certificate (At) in a
market with one compliance period is described by the following FBSDE:
(9)


dDt = µD(Dt)dt+ σD(Dt)dW˜t, D0 = d ∈ (0, ξmax),
dEt = µE(At, Dt)dt, E0 = 0,
dAt = rAtdt+ e
rtZtdW˜t, AT = Π I[Ecap,∞)(ET ).
Proof. Because the filtration (Ft) is natural, it is a consequence of the Martingale
Representation Theorem (cf. [26]) that the discounted allowance price can be rep-
resented as an Itoˆ integral with respect to the Brownian motion (W˜t). It follows
that
(10) d
(
e−rtAt
)
= ZtdW˜t for 0 ≤ t ≤ T
for some Ft-adapted process (Zt).
Combining the processes (5) and (6) for demand and cumulative emissions and
(10) together with the terminal condition (7), the pricing problem becomes that
described by (9). 
Remark 3. The existence and uniqueness of a solution to the FBSDE (9) is a
delicate question. The nonstandardness of this kind of equation arises from the
degeneracy of one of its forward components (the emissions process (Et) in our case)
combined with the singularity of the terminal condition. Together, these features
conspire to cause the random variable ET to develop a point mass at the cap Ecap,
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as shown in [7]. In the same paper it is also shown that under the assumption that
µD and σD are Lipschitz continuous and exhibit at most linear growth and that µE
is Lipschitz continuous and strictly decreasing in A, a unique solution to (9) exists
satisfying the initial conditions D0 = d, E0 = 0 and the relaxed terminal condition
Π I(Ecap,∞)(ET ) ≤ AT ≤ Π I[Ecap,∞)(ET ).
Moreover, it is shown that there exists a continuous function α such that At =
α(t,Dt, Et) for 0 ≤ t < T . Under considerably more restrictive conditions on
the coefficients but preserving the distinctive features of the problem (degeneracy
of the forward component and a singularity in the terminal condition), the value
function α is actually smooth (cf. [8]). Since the original acceptance of this paper for
publication (cf. [25]), new results have been obtained which affirmatively answer
the question of existence and uniqueness of a solution to the FBSDE (9) under
weaker conditions on the regularity of the coefficients µD and σD than required in
[7] and [8]. In fact it is sufficient for µD and σD to exhibit sufficient regularity to
guarantee that the stochastic differential equation for (Dt) has a strong solution.
We refer the interested reader to the thesis [35] for the precise statement and the
proof of the theorem.
Based on the previous remark, we assume that in our Markovian setting there
exists a function α(t,D,E) : [0, T ]× [0, ξmax] × [0, Emax] 7→ [0,Π], such that At =
α(t,Dt, Et), for 0 ≤ t < T , suitably regular on [0, T ) to be a classical solution to
the PDE
Nα = 0 on U, 0 ≤ t < T,
α = Π I[Ecap,∞)(E) on U, t = T,(11)
where U := (0, ξmax)× (0, Emax) and
N· := ∂·
∂t
+
1
2
σ2D(D)
∂2·
∂D2
+ µD(D)
∂·
∂D
+ µE(·, D) ∂·
∂E
− r · .
Notice that µE depends on α; hence the PDE is semilinear (and, in the absence of a
second E-derivative, degenerate parabolic). In addition to the terminal condition,
suitable boundary conditions have to be supplied. These depend on the specification
of the coefficients of the PDE, and we postpone the issue to section 6, where we
discuss the numerical solution of the problem.
Remark 4. The intuition behind (11) is simple. We simply assume that, under
Q, At, being a traded asset, has a drift equal to the risk-neutral rate (cf. the last
equation of (9)). Then we apply Itoˆ’s formula to At = α(t,Dt, Et) using the first
two equations of (9) and take expectations to derive (11). This procedure is purely
formal, because it assumes the existence of a classical solution to the PDE (11).
3.2. Multiple compliance periods. We now consider the pricing problem in an
emission market with two compliance periods. In principle, the results presented
in this section can easily be extended to an arbitrary number of periods. To ease
the presentation, however, we choose to present the canonical case. Taking 0 =
T0 ≤ T1 ≤ T2 = T , we consider the two compliance periods [0, T1], [T1, T ]. For
simplicity we assume that each period corresponds to one year. As previously, the
Ft-adapted process (Dt)t∈[0,T ] represents the aggregate demand for electricity. For
i ∈ {1, 2} the Ft-adapted process (Et)t∈[Ti−1,Ti] measures the cumulative emissions
from the beginning of the ith compliance period up to time t, and (Ait)t∈[Ti−1,Ti]
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represents the price of an allowance certificate for compliance at time Ti. Also, we
denote by E1 the cumulative emissions at the end of the first compliance period.
Each year, the regulator issues a number Eicap ≥ 0 of allowance certificates and sets
the penalty Πi ≥ 0.
Demand for electricity is given at time t = 0 and thereafter evolves continuously
throughout the trading period [0, T ]. Further, we assume that cumulative emissions
are measured from the beginning of each compliance period so that
(12) ETi−1 := 0, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Finally, we note that each process (Ait)t∈[Ti−1,Ti] corresponds to a different vintage
of allowance certificates. If we disregard mechanisms that connect compliance pe-
riods, a certificate issued during the first period is for compliance at time T1 only.
However, we now wish to consider mechanisms that connect compliance periods and
permit allowances to be transferred between periods. In this case both vintages of
certificates have a more complex dependence. In particular, the second period al-
lowance price depends on cumulative emissions during not only the second period
but also the previous period, as we describe below. The connecting mechanism
is now expressed through the terminal condition at time T1; for now, we do not
determine it explicitly and denote it by some (possibly singular) function φ1.
Corollary 1. In a market with two compliance periods, the price (At)t∈[Ti−1,Ti]
of an allowance certificate during the ith period, i ∈ {1, 2}, is described by the
following FBSDE:
(13)


dDt = µD (Dt) dt+ σD (Dt) dW˜t, DTi−1 = d ∈ (0, ξmax),
dEt = µE
(
Dt, A
i
t
)
dt, ETi−1 = 0,
dAit = rA
i
tdt+ e
rtZitdW˜t, ATi = φi,
for some Ft-adapted process (Zit)t∈[Ti−1,Ti] and where φ1 := φ1(ET1) and φ2 :=
φ2(ET2 ;E
1), respectively, denote the terminal condition at the end of the first and
second compliance periods.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Proposition 3 and the discussion above.

As in section 3.1, we assume the existence of suitably regular functions αi :
[Ti−1, Ti]× [0, ξmax]× [0, Emax] 7→ R+ such that Ait = αi(t,Dt, Et) for Ti−1 ≤ t < Ti
and
Nαi = 0 on U, Ti−1 ≤ t < Ti
αi = φi(E) on U, t = Ti.(14)
3.2.1. Banking and withdrawal. Banking and withdrawal are two mechanisms that
connect compliance periods and are implemented in most emission markets. Both
affect the supply of certificates during the second compliance period. This leads us
to introduce Eˆ2cap to denote the aggregate supply of certificates during the second
compliance period. The implementation of banking offers an additional incentive for
reducing emissions, since it specifies that spare allowance certificates, for compliance
at the end of the first period, become perfect substitutes for certificates issued
during the second compliance period. This means that in the event of compliance,
RISK-NEUTRAL PRICING IN EMISSION MARKETS 17
a number (E1cap − E1) of certificates with price A1T1 are exchanged for certificates
valid during the next compliance period, with price A2T1 .
This incentive to reduce emissions is strengthened by the withdrawal mecha-
nism, which constitutes additional punishment for firms that exceed their emission
limit. Under this mechanism not only are excess emissions at the end of the first
compliance period penalized at the rate Π1, but, moreover, a corresponding num-
ber of certificates are withdrawn from the subsequent allocation. Whereas any
amount of certificates can be banked, at most the next period’s allocation can be
withdrawn from the market. Therefore, in the event of noncompliance, a number
min(E1 − E1cap, E2cap) of certificates with price A2T1 are subtracted from E2cap. In
the event that the entire allocation of the second period has been withdrawn and
there remain unaccounted-for emissions (at the end of the first period), we specify
that these are penalized at the combined rate of the first period penalty Π1 and—
to compensate for the lack of certificates that can be withdrawn—an additional
penalty Π¯1 ≥ A2T1 .
These features imply that during the second period the aggregate supply of
certificates now stems from two sources. First, the regulator issues a number of
permits E2cap at the beginning of the period. Second, as explained above, a number
of certificates are banked or withdrawn. The aggregate supply of certificates during
the second period is then given by
(15) Eˆ2cap =
(
E2cap + E
1
cap − E1
)+
.
Figure 3 illustrates the banking and withdrawal mechanisms in the two-period
market under consideration. In Figure 3a compliance at t = T1 leads to the banking
of a number (E1cap − E1) of certificates. The market is in compliance at t = T2
because of this additional supply of certificates. In Figure 3b noncompliance at
t = T1 leads to the withdrawal of a number (E
1 − E1cap) of certificates. This leads
to noncompliance at t = T2 because of the decreased supply of certificates during
the second compliance period, even though cumulative emissions during the period
[T1, T ] are below the second-period cap.
Period 1 Period 2
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(a) Banking.
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(b) Withdrawal.
Figure 3. Compliance period connecting mechanisms in an emis-
sions market with two periods.
The terminal condition φ1 for the allowance price in an emissions market with
two compliance periods connected by the mechanisms of banking and withdrawal
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now follows. Banking implies that in the event of compliance, that is, if ET1 < E
1
cap,
the value of the first period allowance at time T1 equals the value of the second
period allowance at time T1. In the event of noncompliance at time T1 with E
1
cap ≤
ET1 < E
1
cap + E
2
cap, the penalization of excess emissions and the withdrawal of
certificates lead to the first-period allowance certificate taking the value of the sum
of the second-period certificate and the penalty. In the event of noncompliance at
time T1 with ET1 ≥ E1cap+E2cap, the double penalization rule implies that the value
of the first-period allowance certificate equals the sum of Π1 and Π¯1. Therefore, φ1
is given by
(16) φ1(ET1) :=


A2T1 for 0 ≤ ET1 < E1cap,
Π1 +A2T1 for E
1
cap ≤ ET1 < E1cap + E2cap,
Π1 + Π¯1 for E1cap + E
2
cap ≤ ET1 ≤ Emax.
At time T2, the terminal condition φ2 for the allowance price is now the same as
in the one-period case with the exception that the aggregate supply of certificates
Eˆ2cap is used:
(17) φ2 (ET2) :=
{
0 for 0 ≤ ET2 < Eˆ2cap,
Π2 for Eˆ2cap ≤ ET2 ≤ Emax.
Note that the terminal condition φ2 uses the aggregate supply of certificates Eˆ
2
cap,
as defined in (15), and is hence path-dependent. In particular, it depends on
E1, as mentioned earlier. In the context of pricing futures contracts on allowance
certificates in a two-period market, a similar terminal condition was introduced in
[12].
3.2.2. Borrowing, banking, and withdrawal. In addition to banking and withdrawal,
consecutive compliance periods may also be connected by the borrowing mechanism.
The effect of banking and withdrawal at time T1 is to increase the value of the first-
period allowance certificate from zero to A2T1 in the event of compliance (due to
the banking mechanism) and from Π1 to (Π1 + A2T1) or (Π
1 + Π¯1) in the event
of noncompliance (due to the withdrawal mechanism). In contrast, the borrowing
mechanism decreases the probability with which noncompliance occurs.
In an emissions market in which borrowing is allowed, firms may bring forward
certificates from the second allocation E2cap and use them for compliance at time
T1. This does not affect the aggregate supply of certificates during the first com-
pliance period, but whereas previously noncompliance occurred when ET1 ≥ E1cap,
this is no longer the case, as certificates from the second period may be borrowed
to supplement the aggregate supply during the first period. Therefore, noncompli-
ance now occurs only if ET1 ≥ E1cap + E2cap, in which case the entire allocation of
the second period must be borrowed and additional units of excess emissions are
penalized at the combined rate of Π1 and Π¯1.
The borrowing mechanism is illustrated in Figure 4. Compliance at time T1 is
possible only by borrowing a number (E1 − E1cap) of certificates from the second
compliance period. As a result these certificates are deducted from E2cap. In our
example this leads to noncompliance at time T2.
Whereas φ2 continues to be given by (17), the terminal condition φ1 in an emis-
sions market, which connects subsequent compliance periods with the banking,
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Figure 4. Borrowing mechanism in an emissions market with two periods.
borrowing, and withdrawal mechanisms, now follows and is given by
(18) φ1(ET1) :=
{
A2T1 for 0 ≤ ET1 < E1cap + E2cap,
Π1 + Π¯1 for E1cap + E
2
cap ≤ ET1 ≤ Emax.
4. Risk-neutral pricing of European derivatives
We now turn to the arbitrage-free pricing of European derivatives written on the
allowance certificate within our model. For this purpose we work in the emissions
market of section 3.1 with one compliance period.
Our example of choice is a European call (Ct(τ))t∈[0,τ ] with maturity τ , where
0 ≤ τ ≤ T , and strike K ≥ 0, so that its payoff is
Cτ (τ) := (Aτ −K)+ .
We know from Assumption 3 that, for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ ≤ T , the discounted call price
(e−rtCt)t∈[0,τ ] is a martingale under the measure Q. Therefore, it is given as the
discounted conditional expectation of its terminal condition under this measure;
i.e.,
Ct = e
−r(τ−t)E˜
[
(Aτ −K)+
∣∣∣Ft] for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ.
As we argued previously for the allowance certificate, the discounted call price can
be represented as an Itoˆ integral with respect to the Brownian motion (W˜t)t∈[0,τ ].
It follows that
d
(
e−rtCt
)
= ZtdW˜t for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ
and some Ft-adapted process (Zt)t∈[0,τ ].
Letting Ct = v(t,Dt, Et) for 0 ≤ t ≤ τ , where v : [0, τ ]× [0, ξmax] × [0, Emax] 7→
R+, we find that v satisfies
Lv = 0 on U, 0 ≤ t < τ
v = (α(τ,D,E)−K)+ on U, t = τ,(19)
where
L := ∂
∂t
+
1
2
σ2D(D)
∂2
∂D2
+ µD(D)
∂
∂D
+ µE(α(t,D,E), D)
∂
∂E
− r.
The relevant boundary conditions are discussed in section 6.4.
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The key difference between the allowance certificate and the option pricing prob-
lem is that the allowance price (representing the cost of carbon) has an impact on
the rate at which firms emit. This is reflected in the fact that the drift of the
cumulative emissions process depends on the price of the allowance certificate but
not on that of the option. Consequently, the FBSDE (9) is coupled, and the PDE
(11), which describes the allowance price, is nonlinear, whereas (19) is linear.
5. Asymptotics near expiry
In this section (which is not in the original version of the paper [25]) we examine
the asymptotic behaviour of the allowance price near expiry, where the effect of the
nonlinearity is most pronounced.
We recall that the allowance price α(t,D,E) satisfies the PDE
∂α
∂t
+
1
2
σ2D(D)
∂2α
∂D2
+ µD(D)
∂α
∂D
+ µE(α,D)
∂α
∂E
− rα = 0
with the terminal condition
α(T,D,E) = Π I[Ecap,∞)(E)
We examine the behavior near the discontinuity and as t→ T by scaling
T − t = ǫτ, E − Ecap = ǫη
where 0 < ǫ≪ 1 is an artificial small parameter which helps with the book-keeping.
We then expand
α(t,D,E) ∼ α0(τ,D, η) + ǫα1(τ,D, η) + · · · .
At leading order, we obtain
(20) − ∂α0
∂τ
+ µE(α0, D)
∂α0
∂η
= 0
with
α0(0, D, η) =
{
0 η < 0,
Π η ≥ 0.
This is a standard problem and the solution has an expansion fan between the
lines η = −µ−E(D)τ and η = −µ+E(D)τ where µ−E(D) = µE(0, D) and µ+E(D) =
µE(Π, D). We obtain
α0(τ,D, η) =


0 η < −µ−E(D)τ
f(ξ;D) − µ−E(D)τ ≤ η ≤ −µ+E(D)τ
Π η > −µ+E(D)τ,
where ξ = η/τ and the function f(ξ;D) is defined implicitly by µE(f(ξ,D);D) =
−ξ, in which D appears only as a parameter.
The characteristics of (20) are sketched in Figure 5 with D fixed, so that this
is a two-dimensional slice through a three-dimensional expansion fan which varies
parametrically with D. It is important to note that the fan borders (the bold lines)
vary monotonically in D, because µE(·, D) is strictly increasing inD by assumption.
This allows diffusion in the D-direction to smooth the gradient discontinuities that
occur across these lines. Let us look at the lower border—the expansion around
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Figure 5. Sketch of characteristics for leading-order approxima-
tion near expiry.
the upper border is similar—and construct an inner-layer expansion by changing
variables to
η = −µ−E(D)τ + ǫ
1
2 y, α0(τ,D, η) = ǫ
1
2 a0(τ,D, y).
The term 12σ
2
D(D)∂
2α/∂D2 in the original PDE now enters at the same order as
the leading-order terms retained above. We therefore obtain, at leading order, the
nonlinear parabolic PDE
(21)
∂a0
∂τ
=
1
2
σ2D
(
τ
dµ−E
dD
)2
∂a0
∂y
+
dµ−E
dD
a0
∂a0
∂y
with the initial condition
a0(0, D, y) = Πmax(y, 0)
which is the initial gradient discontinuity. (It is this condition that dictates the
scaling for α0 above.)
There is no similarity solution to (21), but its short-time (small τ) behavior is
of the form
a0 ∼ τ 32 g(y/τ 32 ) (1 +O(τ))
where g(z) (writing z = y/τ
3
2 ) satisfies
3
2
(
g − z dg
dz
)
=
1
2
Σ2D
d2g
dz2
,
in which ΣD := σDdµ
−
E/dD. The initial condition forces g(z)→ 0 as z → −∞ and
g(z) ∼ Πz as z →∞, and the solution is
g(z) = Π
(
ζN(ζ) − e−z2/2/
√
2π
)
in which N(·) is the cumulative density of the standard Normal distribution and
ζ = z
√
3/ΣD.
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The far-field behavior of (21) is more straightforward; a balance of the first and
last terms, namely
∂a0
∂τ
∼ dµ
−
E
dD
a0
∂a0
∂y
,
leads to the approximate similarity solution
a0(z, τ) ∼ − 1
dµ−E/dD
z
τ
and this is readily shown to match with the inner expansion of the expansion-fan
solution.
5.1. The probability that ET = Ecap. The incentives offered by the market in
our model pull in two ways. On the one hand, in the absence of a carbon penalty,
Business-As-Usual offers the cheapest (but the dirtiest) means of production—
this is what the bid stack delivers—and in general reducing emissions increases
prices. On the other hand, the threat of paying the penalty should act to keep
total emissions below Ecap. It is therefore interesting to ask whether this tension
leads to a non-zero probability that Et tends to Ecap from below as t→ T . Carmona
& Delarue show (in a different but related model) that precisely this occurs using
techniques of Malliavin calculus (cf. [7]). We now give a heuristic argument why
this occurs (in the framework of our model). The non-zero probability that Et
reaches Ecap from below can be interpreted informally as saying that the feedback
and the associated nonlinearity combine to achieve the largest possible proportion
of total emission trajectories that just miss having to pay the penalty.
To make this more concrete, we start by noting that, as dEt = µE(At, Dt) dt,
continuity of the various functions and processes involved means that paths of Et
are C1. Hence, we expect paths that lie in the expansion fan in Figure 5 for t close
to T to reach E = Ecap (η = 0) tangentially to one of the characteristics in the fan
(extended in the D-direction). This suggests that a whole collection of paths are
forced to the single point ET = Ecap and that the probability mentioned above is
non-zero.
A more quantitative argument is as follows. First note that, for any 0 ≤ E ≤
Emax,
Pt := P (ET > E|Et, Dt) = E
(
I(E,∞)(ET )|Et, Dt
)
.
This conditional expectation satisfies the linear equation (19) with r set to zero,
namely
(22)
∂P
∂t
+
1
2
σ2D(D)
∂2P
∂D2
+ µD(D)
∂P
∂D
+ µE(α(t,D,E), D)
∂P
∂E
= 0.
This is well known; one way to see it in a financial context is to write
Pt = e
r(T−t) × E
(
e−r(T−t)I(E,∞)(ET )|Et, Dt
)
and to note that the second multiplicand above is the value of a derivative contract,
which in the finance literature is known as a digital call option on ET with strike
E , which therefore satisfies (19) with r included; substitution gives the result.
If we define
P±t = P (ET > Ecap ± δ|Et, Dt) ,
then
P (ET = Ecap|Et, Dt) = lim
δ→0
(
P−t − P+t
)
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Now consider the local expansion of (22) near E = Ecap, t = T as above: at leading
order in an expansion P (t, E,D) ∼ P0(τ, η,D) + · · · , we see that
−∂P0
∂τ
+ µE(α0(τ, η,D), D)
∂P0
∂η
= 0.
This linear equation has the same characteristics as its nonlinear cunterpart for α0,
and P0 is constant along them. Thus,
• P+0 is equal to 1 on all characteristics starting from E > Ecap + δ, that is
from just to the right of the right-hand bold line in Figure 5 and upwards,
and zero on all the others (including the expansion fan).
• P−0 is equal to zero on all characteristics starting from E ≤ Ecap − δ, that
is, from just to the left of the left-hand bold line and downwards, and equal
to 1 on all the others (including the expansion fan).7
It is now apparent that P−t −P+t tends to 1 in the expansion fan; and consequently
this non-zero value is propagated out into the whole domain by the equation (22).
That is, we have a non-zero probability that total emissions just reach Ecap from
below (as indicated by the orientation of the expansion fan).
6. Numerical analysis
This section is dedicated to the numerical analysis of the model. We illustrate
the dependency of allowance prices on demand and the cumulative emissions and
compare prices in the setting of a single-period market to those implied by multi-
period markets. Further, we demonstrate the dependence structure of a European
option written on the allowance certificate.
6.1. Concretizing the model. We begin by specifying the functions and param-
eters in the model.
6.1.1. Functional form of the bid and the emissions stack. We take the business-
as-usual bid stack to be of the form
bBAU(ξ) := b+
(
b− b
ξθ1max
)
ξθ1 for 0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξmax,
where b, b ≥ 0 and 2 < θ1 < ∞. With this choice bBAU is strictly convex and
strictly increasing on its domain of definition. The parameters b and b correspond
to the minimum and maximum prices of electricity the model can produce. Because
the range of allowed bids and typically observed market prices in many auction-
based electricity markets is well known, these are relatively easy to infer in practice.
The parameter θ1 controls the steepness of the stack and in particular how quickly
marginal costs of generators increase.
Similarly, we take the marginal emissions stack to be of the form
e(ξ) := e−
(
e− e
ξθ2max
)
ξθ2 for 0 ≤ ξ ≤ ξmax,
7An expansion similar to that above shows that there is a diffusive smoothing of the disconti-
nuity in P± for τ > 0. Using the same notation as above, the solution is less complicated, being
described by the equation
∂p
∂τ
=
1
2
Σ2Dτ
2 ∂p
∂z
with a typical solution taking the form N(z
√
3/ΣD), where again z = y/τ
3
2 .
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where e, e ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ θ2 < 1. With this definition also e is strictly convex
and decreasing on its domain of definition. The parameters e and e correspond to
the minimum and maximum marginal emissions rates in the market. In a market
with coal and gas generators only and under the reasonable assumption that coal
is the more emission-intensive technology than gas, e would represent the marginal
emissions rate of coal and e that of gas. The parameter θ2 controls the fuel mix in
the market. The smaller the value of θ2, the smaller the proportion of the market
capacity that is served by the pollution-intensive technology.
Clearly bBAU and e satisfy the assumptions in Definitions 1 and 2. Further, since
a linear combination of strictly convex functions is also strictly convex, so is the
function g. Therefore, Assumption 2 is also satisfied. Moreover, we note that for
this choice of bid and emissions stack the set Sp(·, ·) is always of the form [ξ1, ξ2]
for 0 ≤ ξ1 ≤ ξ2 ≤ ξmax.
6.1.2. The demand process. We specify that under P˜ the process (Dt) follows the
stochastic differential equation
(23) dDt = −η
(
Dt − D¯
)
dt+
√
2ησ¯DDt (ξmax −Dt)dW˜t, D0 = d ∈ (0, ξmax),
where D, η, σ¯D > 0. With this definition (Dt) is a Jacobi diffusion process; it has
a linear, mean-reverting, drift component and degenerates on the boundary. More-
over, subject to D ∈ (0, ξmax) and min(D, ξmax−D) ≥ ξmaxσ¯D, the process remains
within the interval (0, ξmax); its stationary distribution is a beta distribution, and
its mean is given by D¯ (cf. [18]).
6.1.3. Choice of parameters. Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize the parameter values
used for the numerical study that follows. We note that they do not correspond to
a particular example of an electricity market, but they can be considered represen-
tative of a medium-sized market whose fuel mix predominantly consists of coal and
gas generators.
Table 1 specifies the parameters for the bid and the emissions stack. Using (6)
now with At = 0 and Dt = ξmax for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , and with the assumption that there
are 24× 365 production hours in the year, we find that Emax = 1.6519× 108.
Table 1. Parameters for the bid and emissions stack.
b b θ1 e e θ2 κ ξmax
200 0 10 1.2 0.4 0.4 8760 30000
The parameters relating to demand are given in Table 2.
Table 2. Parameters for the demand process and the risk-free rate.
η D¯ σ¯D r
10 21000 0.05 0.05
Calculating the cumulative emissions now for At = 0 and demand at its mean
level Dt = D¯ for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , we find that ET = 1.2961×108. This leads us to choose
the cap slightly below this level in order to incentivize a reduction in emissions. The
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parameters characterizing the emissions trading scheme are given in Table 3. We
note that here time is measured in years.
Table 3. Parameters characterizing the emissions trading scheme.
Ecap Π T
1.17× 108 100 1
6.2. The allowance price value function. We present the necessary boundary
conditions for the allowance price valuation equation and discuss its solution. First,
this is done in the setting of an emissions market with one compliance period, and
second we consider two periods connected by either banking and withdrawal or
banking, borrowing, and withdrawal.
With regards to problem (11) (in the case of one period) or (14) (in the case
of two periods), the following questions arise: At which points of the boundary
do we need to specify boundary conditions in addition to the terminal condition,
and what conditions make sense given the original stochastic problem (9) or (13)?
The former question is answered by considering the Fichera function f (cf. [32]).
Defining n := (nD, nE) to be the inward normal vector to the boundary, Fichera’s
function for the operator N (and L) reads
f(t,D,E) :=
(
µD(D)− 1
2
∂
∂D
σ2D(D)
)
nD + µE(α(t,D,E), D)nE on ∂UT
(or ∂UTi). In the case when the coefficients µD and σD are of the form prescribed
in (23) we find that
f(t,D,E) = η
((
D¯ − σ¯Dξmax
)
+ (2σ¯D − 1)D
)
nD + µE(α(t,D,E), D)nE on ∂UT
(or ∂UTi). At points of the boundary, where f ≥ 0, information is outward flowing
and no boundary conditions have to be specified; at those points where f < 0 the
information is inward flowing and boundary conditions are necessary. Considering
the parts of the boundary corresponding to D = 0 and D = ξmax, we find that
f ≥ 0 if and only if min(D, ξmax − D) ≥ ξmaxσ¯D, which is the same condition
prescribed in section 6.1.2 to guarantee that the Jacobi diffusion stays within the
interval (0, ξmax). At points of the boundary corresponding to E = 0, we find that
f ≥ 0 always. On the part of the boundary on which E = Emax, f < 0 except at
the point (D,E) = (0, Emax), where f = 0, an ambiguity which could be resolved
by smoothing the domain. Therefore, no boundary conditions are necessary except
when E = Emax. The nature of the condition at this part of the boundary depends
on whether we consider a market with one compliance period or multiple periods,
and we specify it in the relevant sections below.
Given values for the demand for electricity and the cumulative emissions, the val-
uation equation representing the allowance pricing problem determines the arbitrage-
free price of an allowance certificate. We illustrate this dependency by solving the
PDE numerically, using the finite difference scheme explained in Appendix A.
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6.2.1. One compliance period. The boundary condition at E = Emax takes the form
(24) α(t,D,E) = e−r(T−t)Π, [0, T )× (0, ξmax)× {E = Emax}.
The condition (24) follows from the fact that, as soon as the cumulative emissions
surpass the cap, every additional tonne of CO2 is penalized at a rate Π at time T .
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Figure 6. The two plots show the price of an allowance certificate,
in an emission market with one compliance period, at different
times up to expiry (Π = 100e).
The numerical results are displayed in Figure 6. At time t = T/2, the allowance
price depends on the cumulative emissions to date and the current level of demand,
as shown in Figure 6a. For each fixed level of emissions E = ET/2, α(T/2, D,ET/2)
is increasing in D. This makes intuitive sense, since for higher levels of demand, the
corresponding market emissions rate is greater, and consequently it is more likely
that the cap will be reached. Similarly, fixing D = DT/2 results in α(T/2, DT/2, E)
being an increasing function of E. In particular, we can think of the current level
of cumulative emissions determining an interval for the allowance price and the
demand for electricity setting the exact price within this interval. Further, we
notice that the allowance price equals the discounted penalty if cumulative emissions
exceed the cap. At the end of the compliance period, α is given by the terminal
condition (7). Figure 6b reflects the digital nature of the price at this time and its
independence of D.
6.2.2. Multiple compliance periods: Banking and withdrawal. We illustrate the frame-
work introduced in this section for the case of two consecutive compliance periods.
We determine the prices of the first- and second-period allowance certificates as
functions of demand and cumulative emissions. For i = 2, we solve the PDE (14)
with the terminal condition φ2 given by (17). Further, the boundary condition at
E = Emax takes the form
(25) α2 (t,D,E) = e
−r(T2−t)Π2, [T1, T2)× (0, ξmax)× {E = Emax}.
The problem is equivalent to the one-period pricing problem with the exception
that the aggregate supply of certificates Eˆ2cap depends on E
1, the level of the cu-
mulative emissions at the end of the first compliance period. As a result, the price
of the second-period allowance certificate depends not only on the current values of
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t, D, and E but also on E1, i.e., α2 = α2(·, ·, ·;E1). We then solve (14) for i = 1
with the terminal condition φ1 of the form (16), where A
2
T1
= α2(T1, D, 0;E). The
boundary condition at E = Emax now reads
(26) α1 (t,D,E) = e
−r(T1−t)
(
Π1 + Π¯1
)
, [0, T1)× (0, ξmax)× {E = Emax}.
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(a) t = T1/2.
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(b) t = T1.
Figure 7. The two plots show the value of the first-period al-
lowance certificate (A1t )t∈[0,T1] at different times up to compliance
in an emissions market with two compliance periods, which are
connected by the banking and withdrawal mechanisms (Π1 =
100e).
Figure 7a plots the value of the allowance certificate at time t = T1/2. The
effects of banking and withdrawal become very clear as the value of the certificate
exceeds the penalty for a sufficiently high level of cumulative emissions. At the end
of the compliance period α is given by the terminal condition (16), as shown in
Figure 7b. Concerning the price behavior of the second-period certificate, we note
that it mirrors the one-period model with the initial allocation Ecap replaced by
Eˆ2cap.
6.2.3. Multiple compliance periods: Borrowing, banking, and withdrawal. As in the
previous section, we analyze the prices of allowance certificates in this market in the
two-period setting (see Figure 8). During the second compliance period the problem
is equivalent to the market that only uses the banking and withdrawal mechanisms
as described in section 3.2.1. This is the case, because in both markets the effect on
the aggregate supply of certificates during the second period is the same. Suppose
the market is in compliance at time t = T1. Then, a number (E
1
cap − E1) of
certificates are banked to the second period and added to E2cap, independently of
whether borrowing is allowed or not. Otherwise, if the market is not in compliance
at time t = T1, a number min(E
1 − E1cap, E2cap) of certificates are withdrawn from
E2cap (if borrowing is not allowed), or the same number are brought forward and
hence also deducted from E2cap (if borrowing is allowed). Therefore, for i = 2 we
solve the PDE (14) with terminal condition (17) and obtain α2 = α2(·, ·, ·;E1).
Subsequently, we solve (14) for i = 1 together with the terminal condition φ1 given
by (17), where A2T1 = α2(T1, D, 0;E). The boundary condition at E = Emax is
given by (26).
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Figure 8. The value of the first-period allowance certificate
(A1t )t∈[0,T1] at different times up to compliance, with two com-
pliance periods, connected by the borrowing, banking, and with-
drawal mechanisms.
6.3. The impact of cap-and-trade. The raison d’eˆtre of any cap-and-trade
scheme is to reduce emissions. More precisely, its aim is to incentivize sufficient load
shifting throughout the trading period for the cumulative emissions not to reach
the cap. In our modeling set-up we illustrate the effectiveness of cap-and-trade by
calculating the expected cumulative emissions at the end of the compliance period
for different levels of the penalty Π. Recall that the penalty represents an upper
bound for the allowance price; the case Π = 0 corresponds to business-as-usual and
increasing Π to a gradually more aggressive cap-and-trade scheme.
We simulate the cumulative emissions process (Et) using the Monte Carlo scheme
explained in Appendix B, choosing D0 = 0.7ξmax. We repeat this simulation for
values of the penalty ranging from zero to 200 and calculate the mean ofET , denoted
by EˆT . We note that for the present purpose of analyzing the cumulative emissions,
the simulation of demand should take place under the physical measure P, which is
related to Q by the market price of demand risk. This measure can be accurately
estimated from market data (see, for example, [17] for different approaches). In the
absence of a detailed data analysis, however, we follow the time-honored approach
of letting the market price of demand risk be constant and equal to zero. Therefore,
for the purposes of our simulation we work with the stochastic differential equation
(23).
Figure 9 plots the results of the simulation of 106 paths. Under business-as-usual
the cumulative emissions are expected to exceed the cap. As emissions trading is
introduced, the market reacts by abating, but initially (at a penalty level of Π = 25)
the cumulative emissions still exceed the cap. Further increases in the penalty (close
to Π = 100) lead to sufficient load shifting in order for the market to reach a state
of compliance. More aggressive regulation now leads only to small reductions in
the cumulative emissions; i.e., our analysis confirms the well-known stylized fact
that emissions trading cannot incentivize firms to reduce cumulative emissions far
below the cap.
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Figure 9. Mean of the cumulative emissions ET for different val-
ues of the penalty Π. The level of the cap is represented by the
dashed line.
6.4. A call option on emissions. For the numerical solution of the call option,
we specify
(27) v(t,D,E) = e−r(T−t)
(
Π− er(T−τ)K
)+
on [0, τ)×(0, ξmax)×{E = Emax}.
The condition (27) follows from recalling that when E = Emax the value of the
allowance certificate α is given by α(t,D,E) = e−r(T−t)Π. For the same reasons as
put forward in section 3.1, boundary conditions at D = 0, ξmax and E = 0 are not
necessary.
Because the PDE (19) requires the allowance price as an input parameter, it
is necessary to solve (19) and (11) in parallel in order to obtain the value of the
option. The numerical scheme that determines the price of the call as a function of
the demand for electricity and the cumulative emissions is explained in Appendix
A.3, and the resulting value surface is plotted in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. The price of a call option, with strike K, on the al-
lowance certificate, in an emissions market with one compliance
period, at different times up to expiry.
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7. Conclusion
Emissions trading has become one of the most popular policy instruments em-
ployed by regulators to reduce global emissions. Allowance certificates—the key
financial instruments in emission markets—and derivatives on them are traded ac-
tively on exchanges today despite the lack of an established theoretical pricing
framework taking the subtleties of these markets into account.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, by appealing to the bid stack,
the key price-setting mechanism in electricity markets (which we suggest is a rea-
sonable description of more general markets as well), we introduce the idea of load
shifting and show how the cost of carbon affects which firms are supplying electric-
ity to the market. This immediately allows us to deduce the rate at which emissions
accumulate during a compliance period. Because we derive the cumulative emis-
sions process starting with an exogenously defined stochastic process for demand,
we offer an explanation for the noncompliance event, which is the main price dri-
ver of allowance certificates. Second, we embed the load shifting mechanism in a
continuous time pricing framework for allowance certificates, taking the form of a
forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE). Within this set-up the
extension to price derivatives on the allowance certificate is immediate. Third, in
the setting of an emission market with multiple compliance periods, we analyze the
impact different connecting mechanisms have on the allowance price.
Appendix A. Numerical solution of the allowance and option pricing
problem
We comment on the numerical scheme employed to solve the allowance and
option pricing PDEs.
A.1. One compliance period. We discretize the computational domain by choos-
ing mesh widths ∆D, ∆E and a time step ∆t. The discrete mesh points (Di, Ej , tk)
are then defined by
Di := i∆D,
Ej := j∆E,
tk := k∆t.
The finite difference scheme we employ produces approximations αki,j , which are
assumed to converge to the true solution α as the mesh width tends to zero.
Since the PDE (11) is posed backward in time with a terminal condition, we
choose a backward finite difference for the time derivative in order to work with an
explicit scheme.
In the E-direction we are approximating a conservation law PDE with discon-
tinuous terminal condition. (For an in-depth discussion of numerical schemes for
these types of equations, see [28].) The first derivative in the E-direction, relating
to the nonlinear part of the PDE, is discretized against the drift direction using a
one-sided upwind difference. Because characteristic information is propagating in
the direction of decreasing E, this one-sided difference is also used to calculate the
value of the approximation on the part of the boundary corresponding to E = 0.
In the D-direction the equation is parabolic everywhere except on the boundary,
where it degenerates. Hence we use central differences to discretize the first- and
second-order derivatives. At the boundaries corresponding to D = 0 and D =
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ξmax, where the second derivative vanishes and no boundary conditions need to be
specified, we again use a one-sided difference in our numerical scheme.
With smooth boundary data on a smooth domain and with a strictly decreasing
(in α) coefficient µE , the scheme described above can be expected to exhibit first-
order convergence. In our setting, we expect the discontinuous terminal condition
and the fact that µE is merely decreasing in α to have adverse effects on the
convergence rate.
We analyze the convergence of our numerical scheme in the supremum norm and
the 1-norm at t = 0; i.e., we calculate
Err∞l :=
‖αhl − αhl+1‖∞
‖αhl‖∞
and Err1l :=
‖αhl − αhl+1‖1
‖αhl‖1
,
where αhl represents the approximate solution given the vector of mesh parameters
hl at refinement level l and
‖αki,j‖1 :=
∑
i,j
∣∣αki,j∣∣∆D∆E.
The parameters that define the different mesh widths are displayed in Table 4;
here we ensured that our choice honors the Courant–Friedrichs–Lewy condition for
the convergence of explicit schemes (cf. [28]). As mentioned above, we expect the
main contributions to the error to stem from the hyperbolic part of the equation.
Therefore, we choose a very fine grid in the E-direction for our analysis.
Table 4. Parameters for the convergence analysis of the numerical scheme.
h1 h2 h3 h4 h5
Dmax/∆D 6 12 24 48 96
Emax/∆E 100 200 400 800 1600
1/∆t 110 440 1760 7040 28160
Table 5 displays the results from our convergence study. Note that the error
decays much faster in the 1-norm. This is not at all surprising, as we expect the
error from the discontinuous terminal condition to propagate in the direction of
decreasing E. This leads to a significant error on a small part of the grid, which is
picked up by the infinity norm, whereas the approximation converges much faster
everywhere else, as shown by our analysis of the error in the 1-norm.
Table 5. Numerical error in the supremum and the 1-norm.
l 1 2 3 4
Err∞l 0.0746 0.0355 0.0227 0.0105
Err1l 0.0066 0.0020 0.0013 0.0006
Figure 11 plots the error Err∞l as a function of the mesh width. From the slope
of the line of best fit through the error points, we estimate the convergence rate of
our scheme to be 0.9131 in the infinity norm.
32 SAM HOWISON AND DANIEL SCHWARZ
1 2 3 4
0.0105
0.0227
0.0355
0.0746
Convergence in the mesh width
l
Er
r∞ l
 
 
Numerical error Err∞l
Linear regression
Slope = −0.9131
Figure 11. Illustration of the convergence of the finite difference
scheme used to solve (11).
A.2. Multiple compliance periods. To deal with the path-dependency that en-
ters the pricing problem in an emissions market with multiple compliance periods—
in the case of banking and withdrawal—through the terminal condition (16) and
(17), we have introduced the extra variable E1.
The problem is then solved backward beginning with the second compliance
period, for which we solve the PDE (14) with corresponding boundary conditions
and the terminal condition (17), introducing an extra dimension for the variable
E1. We then store α2(T1, D, 0;E
1).
Subsequently, we solve the PDE corresponding to the first compliance period,
using the stored values of α2 for the evaluation of the terminal condition.
We compute the numerical approximation to each αi using the scheme described
in section A.1. For a market in which banking, borrowing, and withdrawal are
implemented, the terminal condition at the end of the first period is modified in
the obvious way.
We note that, compared with the single-period problem, the multiperiod problem
has an extra dimension due to the variableE1. When solving the problem beginning
with the second compliance period, this increases the complexity in two ways. First,
the PDE (14) must be solved for a sufficiently large number of values of E1. Second,
we need to store α2 (T2, D, 0) since it is needed for the terminal condition of α1.
A.3. Option pricing problem. We use the obvious modification of the earlier
scheme described in section A.1 to solve the option pricing PDE (19).
Appendix B. Monte Carlo simulation of cumulative emissions
Let (Dk, Ek, Ak) denote the discrete time approximation to the FBSDE solution
(Dt, Et, At) on the time grid 0 < ∆t < 2∆t < · · · < nk∆t = T . At each time
step we calculate Ak by interpolating the discrete approximation α
k
i,j at Dk, Ek,
beginning with the initial values D0 = d,E0 = 0. The approximations (Dk, Ek) are
obtained using a simple Euler scheme (cf. [19]). The discretized version of (Dt) is
forced to be instantaneously reflecting at the boundaries Dk = 0 and Dk = ξmax.
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Using this discretization we simulate nc paths and, as usual, calculate the mean
cumulative emissions EˆT , given by
EˆT :=
1
nc
nc∑
i=1
Eink ,
whereEink denotes the outcome of the simulation of the ith path. The corresponding
standard error σˆEˆ is obtained by
σˆEˆ :=
√√√√ 1
nc (nc − 1)
nc∑
i=1
(
Eink − EˆT
)2
.
Table 6 displays the results of our Monte Carlo simulation.
Table 6. Monte Carlo estimate of the mean cumulative emissions
EˆT and the corresponding standard error σˆEˆ .
Π 0 25 50 75 100 150 200
EˆT (1 × 108) 1.32 1.23 1.20 1.18 1.17 1.16 1.15
σˆ
Eˆ
(1 × 103) 5.91 7.30 6.20 5.53 5.20 4.56 4.36
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